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This article introduces the classic accounts of the meaning of condition-
als (material implication, strict implication, variably strict conditional) and
discusses the diﬀerence between indicative and subjunctive/counterfactual
conditionals. Then, the restrictor analysis of Lewis/Kratzer/Heim is intro-
duced as a theory of how conditional meanings come about compositionally:
if has no meaning other than serving to mark the restriction to an operator
elsewhere in the conditional construction. Some recent alternatives to the
restrictor analysis are sketched. Lastly, the interactions of conditionals (i)
with modality and (ii) with tense and aspect are discussed. Throughout the
advanced research literature is referenced while the discussion stays largely
non-technical.
1 Conditional meanings and ways of expressing them
Conditionals are sentences that talk about a possible scenario that may or
may not be actual and describe what (else) is the case in that scenario; or,
considered from “the other end”, conditionals state in what kind of possible
scenarios a given proposition is true. The canonical form of a conditional is a
two-part sentence consisting of an “antecedent” (also: “premise”, “protasis”)
marked with if and a “consequent” (“apodosis”) sometimes marked with then
(the syntax and semantics of then is an interesting subject, which we won’t
cover here, see e.g. Iatridou (1993)):
(1) If Grijpstra played his drums, (then) de Gier played his flute.
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Conditional meanings can be conveyed with other means as well, each of
which merits its own study:
(2) Had he admitted his guilt, he would have gotten oﬀ easier.
(3) Take another step and I’ll knock you down.
(4) He was pushed or he wouldn’t have fallen down the cliﬀ.
(5) Without you, I would be lost.
(6) I would have beaten Kasparov.
Some languages are reported to have no conditional construction of the if
. . . then-type and use paratactic means only (see for example Levinson 2000:
p.125 on Guugu Yimithirr):
(7) Nyundu
You
budhu
maybe
dhadaa,
go
nyundu
you
minha
meat
maanaa
get
bira.
for sure
‘Maybe you will go, (then) you will certainly get meat.’
= ‘If you go, you’ll get meat.’
The cross-linguistic study of conditionals and the various means by which
conditional meanings can be expressed is only in its infancy. Here, we will
focus on the canonical if . . . (then) construction of English as our object of
investigation.
The semantics of conditionals is an exceptionally rich topic at the inter-
sections of semantics, pragmatics, philosophy of language, and the cognitive
science of reasoning. The concept of conditionality is in many ways central to
human thought and action. One might note that conditionals are a primary
exhibit for one of the “design features” of human language: displacement
(Hockett & Altmann 1968).
Exactly what conditionals mean and how they come to mean what they
mean is one of the oldest problems in natural language semantics. According
to Sextus Empiricus, the Alexandrian poet Callimachus reported that the
Greek philosophers’ debate about the semantics of the little word if had
gotten out of hand: “Even the crows on the roof-tops are cawing about which
conditionals are true”. It finally became too much for Cicero, who famously
complained in his Academica:
In this very thing, which the dialecticians teach among the
elements of their art, how one ought to judge whether an
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argument be true or false which is connected in this manner,
‘If it is day, it shines’, how great a contest there is;—Diodorus
has one opinion, Philo another, Chrysippus a third. Need I say
more?
It is unclear whether we are any closer to solving Cicero’s Problem.
2 Types of conditionals
There are four types of conditionals that have been distinguished in the
literature. Starting with a type that often gets short shrift (as it will here;
see though DeRose & Grandy 1999, Siegel 2006, and Predelli 2009, among
others), there are conditionals variously called speech act conditionals, biscuit
conditionals, relevance conditionals:
(8) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them. (Austin 1956)
(9) I paid you back yesterday, if you remember. (P.T. Geach p.c. to Austin
1956)
These conditionals do not state in any sense conditions under which the
consequent is true, rather they seem to somehow operate on a higher speech
act level.
Another not all that well-studied kind of conditional is what Iatridou called
“factual” conditionals (called “premise conditionals” in Haegeman 2003),
conditionals that often echo someone else’s introduction of the antecedent:
(10) If you’re so clever, why don’t you do this problem on your own?
(11) If it is indeed that late, we should leave.
The two main kinds of conditionals that semantic research has been con-
cerned with are usually called indicative and subjunctive/counterfactual
conditionals:
(12) a. If Grijpstra played his drums, de Gier played his flute. (indicative)
b. If Grijpstra had played his drums, de Gier would have played his
flute. (subjunctive/counterfactual)
The terminology is of course linguistically inept (as we’ll discuss in Sec-
tion 6.2, the morphological marking is one of tense and aspect, not of indica-
tive vs. subjunctive mood), but it is so deeply entrenched that it would be
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foolish not to use it. Superficially, the striking diﬀerence between the two
kinds of conditionals is that indicative conditionals somehow convey that
the truth of the antecedent is an open issue, while subjunctive conditionals
seem to convey that the antecedent is false. (Are there conditionals that
convey that the antecedent is true? Perhaps, if one considers locutions like
since or given that to be conditional connectives.) Upon closer investigation,
it is not possible to maintain that subjunctive conditionals are invariably
counterfactual in this sense, as shown dramatically by an example due to
Anderson (1951):
(13) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those
symptoms which he does in fact show.
A doctor who utters (13) might be prepared to use it as part of an argument
that the antecedent is in fact true, so the subjunctive conditional could
not be conveying counterfactuality as part of its meaning. There are some
subjunctive conditionals that arguably are automatically counterfactual, for
example the ones that Ippolito (2003) calls “mismatched past counterfactuals”
and the verb-first counterfactuals studied by Iatridou & Embick (1993):
(14) If Charlie had married Sally tomorrow, he would have had his bachelor
party tonight. #So, let’s see whether the party is tonight.
(15) Had Charlie married Sally yesterday, they would have left on their
honeymoon by now. #So, let’s see whether they’re gone.
Even abstracting away from the issue of counterfactuality, there are strong
reasons to conclude that the two kinds of conditionals are quite diﬀerent in
their meaning. This is best shown by minimal pairs, the most famous one of
which is due to Adams (1970):
(16) a. If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.
b. If Oswald hadn’t killed Kenney, someone else would have.
While most people would accept (16a) as true (since they know that Kennedy
was assassinated), only the most conspiracy-minded would accept (16b).
The meaning of the indicative conditional seems to correspond fairly
accurately to the “Ramsey Test” (Ramsey 1931):
If two people are arguing “If p will q?” and are both in doubt
as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of
5
knowledge and arguing on that basis about q.
Knowing that Kennedy was assassinated and having maybe only the slightest
doubt that the assassin may not have been Oswald, our stock of knowledge
incremented hypothetically with Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy would support
somebody else killed Kennedy, and thus we accept (16a) as true.
Informally, (16b) is evaluated quite diﬀerently. We are invited to go back
to the time around Kennedy’s assassination and project how things would
have turned out if Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy. And many of us have only
the haziest ideas of what would have happened, certainly no conviction that
some assassination was inevitable. So, we reject (16b).
The questions for the semanticist are two-fold: (i) what is the formal
analysis of the diﬀerent meanings that conditionals convey, and (ii) how
are these meanings compositionally derived? A quick look at the examples
suggest that there are significant diﬀerence in meaning deriving from the
tense/aspect/mood morphology on the verbs in the two clauses. So, in the
end, we’d like a compositional analysis that explains the semantic eﬀects
of these morphological choices. First, though, we will focus on the prior
question here: what do conditionals mean?
Before we turn to the main theories of conditional meaning, we should
note that semantic analyses of conditionals are also responsible for explain-
ing a host of facts concerning the combination of conditionals with other
constructions. These include: the role of then in the consequent, complex
conditionals like only if, even if, unless, modals in the consequent, disjunc-
tions in the antecedent, negative polarity items in the antecedent (cf. article
XX (Giannakidou) Polarity items), embedding of conditionals under quanti-
fiers (cf. article XX (Keenan) Quantifiers), conditional questions (cf. article XX
(Krifka) Questions), conditional imperatives (cf. article XX (Han) Imperatives).
Only some of these will be touched on in this article. The field is wide open
for a lot of exciting future research.
3 The classic accounts and beyond
The classic analyses of conditionals, some of whom were already discussed
by the crows of Ancient Greece, are (i) if . . . (then) . . . as a truth-functional
connective, material implication, (ii) the strict conditional analysis, (iii) the
non-monotonic possible worlds analyses of Stalnaker and Lewis.
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3.1 Material implication
If conditionals correspond to a two-valued truth-functional connective, it has
to be the one dubbed “material implication”, which yields falsity if and only
if the antecedent is true but the consequent is false. Suber (1997) presents a
good example motivating this distribution of truth-values. A professor who
declares that If I am healthy, I will come to class can only be said to have
broken her promise if she is healthy but doesn’t come to class. Clearly, if
she is healthy and comes to class, she’ll have spoken the truth. And if she is
sick, it is immaterial whether she comes to class (going beyond the call of
duty and beyond what she promised) or doesn’t—neither case constitutes a
breaking of the promise.
One of the “paradoxes of material implication” (not paradoxes in the
sense of a formal system that is internally incoherent, but shortcomings in
the match between the formal analysis and the natural language data it might
be thought to cover) is that disbelief in the antecedent p should result in a
proportionate willingness to believe if p, q, no matter what the consequent
q might be, because as soon as the antecedent is false, material implication
makes the conditional true no matter what the consequent is. Clearly, this
does not correspond to the actual behavior of language users. Just because I
find it unlikely in the extreme that the sun will explode in a minute from now,
I do not find it likely at all that if the sun explodes in a minute from now, a
Vogon Constructor spaceship will come and rescue all of Earth’s inhabitants.
There are several heroic eﬀorts (cf. in particular Jackson 1979, 1987) to
maintain that material implication is an adequate semantics for natural lan-
guage conditionals— in particular, indicative conditionals. The general idea
is to supplement a material implication semantics with a sophisticated prag-
matics of assertibility, whether derivable via standard Gricean conversational
implicature or stipulated as a construction-specific conventional implicature.
Jackson argues that indicative conditionals trigger a conventional implicature
that the assertion as a whole is robust with respect to the antecedent; that
is, that a speaker who utters an indicative conditionals is not just claiming
that the material conditional is true but is also signalling that should the
antecedent turned out to be true they would still claim that the material
conditional is true. In the exploding sun example, above, Jackson would say
that while I do (almost) believe that the indicative conditional is true, strictly
speaking, because I believe that the antecedent is very likely to be false, I do
not believe in the robustness of the conditional relative to its antecedent. If it
7
turned out to be true that the sun will explode in a minute from now, I would
then not believe the material conditional anymore. So, I’m not in a position
to assert the conditional because I would be sending the wrong signal (that
my belief in it was robust with respect to the antecedent). Edgington (2007:
135-138) raises an important objection to the implicature-based accounts: the
non-equivalence between indicative conditionals and material implication
doesn’t just arise at the level of assertibility. The problem with the exploding
sun example isn’t just that I can’t assert it properly, rather: I don’t even
believe the conditional to the extent I should. Bennett (2003: Chapters 2
and 3) gives other strong arguments against Grice/Jackson-style theories; at
the same time, the perhaps quixotic goal of defending material implication
with non-truth-conditional enhancements continues to be pursued, see for
example Rieger (2006).
In linguistic work, the material implication account (pragmatically en-
riched or not) is usually dismissed because of the unsurmountable problems
it faces when one looks at embedded conditionals. One such case is the
embedding of indicative conditionals under nominal quantifiers:
(17) a. Every student will succeed if he works hard.
b. No student will succeed if he goofs oﬀ.
As first discussed by Higginbotham (1986), the material implication analysis
may be adequate for (17a) but it is clearly wrong for (17b), which would be
predicted to mean that every student goofs oﬀ and doesn’t succeed.
3.2 Possible worlds semantics for conditionals
C.I. Lewis (1918) proposed his “strict implication” as a better approximation
of ordinary conditionals. According to this analysis, if p, q is true iﬀ the
material implication is necessarily true. This would for example deal quite
well with the fact that the exploding sun conditional is not one that one
should believe just because the antecedent is very likely to be false. Whether
or not it is even possible that a Vogon Constructor fleet would rescue Earth’s
inhabitants it is certainly possible that the sun explodes and we are not
rescued, and thus the material implication is not necessarily true, and thus
the strict implication account predicts that the conditional is false, which is
a good reason not believe it.
If one assumes a possible worlds semantics for notions like necessity,
the strict implication analysis amounts to the claim that if p, q is true iﬀ q
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is true in all worlds in which p is true. By far the most influential seman-
tics for conditionals, in particular counterfactual conditionals, developed
independently by Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973), departs from the strict
implication analysis in that it doesn’t quantify over all p-worlds but just
about a distinguished subset thereof. This move is motivated in part by
problems with conditional inferences, as we will soon see.
To a first approximation, the Stalnaker/Lewis analysis assumes an order-
ing of the set of worlds according to how similar they are to the world of
evaluation (the one for which the truth of the conditional is being evaluated).
Rather than saying that if p, q is true iﬀ q is true in all worlds in which p is
true, the Stalnaker/Lewis account selects from the worlds in which p is true
those that are most similar to the evaluation world and claims just about
those most similar p-worlds that they are q-worlds. This has significant
eﬀects on what kind of inferences will be valid with conditionals.
Under the strict implication analysis, the pattern known as Strengthening
the Antecedent, for example, is predicted to be valid:
(18) Strengthening the Antecedent
if p, q
ê if p & r , q
If all (contextually relevant) p-worlds are q-worlds, then a fortiori all p&r -
worlds, a subset of the p-worlds, have to be q-worlds.
This pattern becomes invalid in the Stalnaker/Lewis analyses. If the p-
worlds that are most similar to the evaluation world are all q-worlds, that
does necessitate that the most similar p&r -worlds are also all q-worlds.
Lewis (1973) gives a humorous example:
(19) a. If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over.
b. 6) If kangaroos had no tails but used crutches, they would topple
over.
(19a) intuitively does not license the inference to (19b). The similarity-based
analyses explain why: the worlds where kangaroos have no tails but that are
otherwise as similar as possible to the evaluation world are not worlds where
kangaroos use crutches, so the first conditional does not connect logically to
the second conditional. The Stalnaker/Lewis analyses thus diﬀer from the
strict implication analysis in being non-monotonic or as Lewis put it “variably
strict”.
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Other patterns that are expected to be valid under the strict implication
analysis but arguably aren’t are Hypothetical Syllogism and Contraposition:
(20) Failure of the Hypothetical Syllogism (Transitivity)
If Hoover had been a Communist, he would have been a traitor.
If Hoover had been born in Russia, he would have been a Communist.
6) If Hoover had been born in Russia, he would have been a traitor
[Example due to Stalnaker 1968]
(21) Failure of Contraposition
(Even) if Goethe hadn’t died in 1832, he would still be dead now.
6) If Goethe were alive now, he would have died in 1832.
[Example due to Kratzer 1979]
The non-monotonic analyses predict correctly that Hypothetical Syllogism
(Transitivity) fails because even if all the closest (most similar to the evalua-
tion world) p-worlds are q-worlds and all the closest q-worlds are r -worlds,
we are not necessarily speaking about the same q-worlds (the q-worlds that
p takes us to may be rather remote ones). So in the Hoover-example, we
get the following picture: The closest p-worlds in which Hoover was born in
Russia (but where he retains his level of civic involvement), are all q- worlds
in which he becomes a Communist. On the other hand, the closest q-worlds
in which he is a Communist (but retaining his having been born in the United
States and being a high level administrator) are all r -worlds in which he is
a traitor. The closest p-worlds do not include the closest q-worlds, so the
Transitive inference does not go through.
Again, the non-monotonic analyses correctly predict that Contraposition
fails because the assumption that the closest p-worlds are q-worlds does not
preclude a situation where the closest non-q-worlds are also p-worlds. The
selected p-worlds in which Goethe didn’t die in 1832 are all q-worlds where
he dies nevertheless (well) before the present. But of course, the closest (in
fact, all) non-q-worlds (where he is alive today) are also p-worlds where he
didn’t die in 1832.
Lewis and Stalnaker diﬀer in their assumptions about the similarity order-
ing. Stalnaker assumes that for any (non-contradictory) antecedent and any
evaluation world, there will be a unique most similar antecedent world. Lewis
neither makes this Uniqueness Assumption nor the weaker Limit Assump-
tion (that for any antecedent and evaluation world, there is a set of most
similar antecedent worlds). For discussion of this diﬀerence, see Lewis (1973:
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19–21) and Stalnaker (1984: Chapter 7, esp. pp. 140–142); Pollock (1976),
Herzberger (1979), and Warmbrod (1982) argue for the Limit Assumption as
well. Informally, here, we have been using the Limit Assumption but not
the Uniqueness Assumption when we talk about the most similar or closest
antecedent worlds. The issues discussed under this heading are relevant
for the attempt we’ll mention later to treat conditionals as definite (plural?)
descriptions of possible worlds; see Section 5.1.
A variant of the ordering based semantics is given by “premise semantics”,
inspired by Goodman (1947) and Rescher (1964) and developed in rival forms
by Kratzer (1977, 1979, 1981) and Veltman (1976). Lewis (1981) showed that
technically the two approaches are intertranslateable. More recent work in
the premise semantic tradition includes Kratzer (1989), Djordjevic (2005),
Veltman (2005), Kanazawa et al. (2005), Kratzer (2005).
3.3 The indicative/subjunctive distinction
We have now surveyed the three classic theories of conditional meaning, and
we will soon look at more recent variants and alternatives. At this point,
though, let us discuss how one could approach the indicative/subjunctive
distinction in terms of the classic approaches.
While the Oswald/Kennedy pair shows that indicatives and subjunctives
have distinct truth-conditions, it is not obvious how distinct they should
be seen as. Do they have distinctly diﬀerent kinds of meanings? Or is the
diﬀerence more subtle?
Among philosophers and logicians, it is very commonly held that quite
diﬀerent approaches are appropriate. David Lewis, for example, thought that
his variably strict semantics was not applicable to indicatives (he favored
material implication plus Jackson’s pragmatic enrichment for those). Others
adopt even more radically diﬀerent analyses for indicatives, such as the
conditional assertion view or the “No Truth-Value” (NTV) view, both of which
we’ll briefly discuss below.
Some indication that the semantics for the two kinds of conditionals
shouldn’t be all that diﬀerent comes from the fact that they seem to show
the same kind of inference patterns (or invalidity patterns). For example,
Strengthening the Antecedent fails with indicatives just as it did with sub-
junctives:
(22) a. If John left before noon, he arrived in time for the meeting.
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b. 6) If John left before noon but got in a car accident, he arrived in
time for the meeting.
For a linguistically realistic semantics, it would also be relevant that both
kinds of conditionals employ the connective if (although we’ll soon see that
that might not actually mean that much) and that the only overt distinction
between the two kinds lies in tense and aspect morphology, which might
suggest that there shouldn’t be a deep semantic division.
Stalnaker (1975) argues that his version of the non-monotonic semantics
for conditionals is applicable to both indicatives and subjunctives and that
the only diﬀerence is that indicatives come with the default assumption that
the selected antecedent world is within the context set (the set of worlds
that are compatible with the current assumptions of the conservation). In
other words, the subjunctive conditional is chosen when for some reason, the
speaker does not want the assumption in place that the selected antecedent
world is compatible with what is taken for granted. As explored in von Fintel
(1999b), this approach predicts not only that subjunctives are chosen when
the antecedent is known to be counterfactual but also in Anderson-type
cases, as repeated here:
(13) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those
symptoms which he does in fact show.
Within the context set, all the worlds are trivially worlds where Jones shows
the symptoms he shows. So, for the conditional to be non-trivial the world
that the antecedent is taking us to needs to be outside the context set, even
though the speaker in the end intends the hearer to infer that Jones did take
arsenic. Since the conditional needs to reach outside the context set, we need
to use subjunctive marking.
3.4 Dynamic strict analyses
Let us return to the argument from the apparent failure of Strengthening the
Antecedent. When Lewis discussed this, he tried to forestall the idea that
what is treated as semantic non-monotonicity in his account could actually
be explained in a strict implication account by saying that the contextually
relevant set of worlds that the conditional quantifies over is easily shifted
in a sequence of sentences. He argued that this move would not be able to
explain the well-formedness of what became known as Sobel Sequences:
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(23) If the USA threw its weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be
war; but if all the nuclear powers threw their weapons into the sea
tomorrow, there would be peace.
Lewis deliberately put this example “in the form of a single run-on sentence,
with the counterfactuals of diﬀerent stages conjoined by semicolons and
but”, suggesting that it would be a “defeatist” move to say that in such a
tight sequence the context could shift in response to the introduction of a
new antecedent clause.
Defeatist or not, based on an observation by Heim (MIT class handout),
von Fintel (2001b) develops such an account. Heim had noted that Lewis’
Sobel Sequence cannot be reversed:
(24) ??If all the nuclear powers threw their weapons into the sea tomorrow,
there would be peace; but if the USA threw its weapons into the sea
tomorrow, there would be war.
This is unexpected from the point of view of a semantically non-monotonic
analysis. In von Fintel’s paper, a dynamic strict analysis is developed in
which the antecedent has the potential to expand the “modal horizon”, the
set of contextually relevant possible worlds which the conditional then ranges
over. It is shown that if the expansion of the modal horizon is governed
by the same similarity ordering used in the Stalnaker/Lewis systems, the
analysis replicates the truth-conditions of those systems for isolated or
discourse-initial conditionals. The context shifts become only relevant in
sequences of conditionals and then create the appearance of semantic non-
monotonicity. One crucial argument von Fintel gives for his account is that
negative polarity items are licensed in the antecedent of conditionals and
that therefore we would prefer a monotonic analysis. It turns out, however,
that only a very special notion of monotonicity (dubbed Strawson Downward
Entailingness) holds for von Fintel’s conditionals: these conditionals are
downward monotone in their antecedent only under the assumption that the
initial context is such that the modal horizon is already large enough to be
unaﬀected by any of the conditionals in the sequence. This idea is explored
for other puzzles for NPI-licensing in von Fintel (1999a); cf. also article 64
(Giannakidou) Polarity items. The dynamic strict analysis is developed further
by Gillies (2007) and critically compared to a pragmatically supplemented
non-monotonic analysis by Moss (2007).
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3.5 Conditional assertion
For at least some types of conditionals, it may make sense to think of the
if -clause as operating at a speech act level. That is, perhaps, the if -clause
does not actually change the truth-conditions of the consequent clause it
is attached to, but it marks that the content of the consequent clause is
only to be considered as asserted if the antecedent is true. This “conditional
assertion” account might be most appropriate for “biscuit-conditionals”
(mentioned earlier), see DeRose & Grandy (1999), for example. Lycan (2006)
argues that conditional assertion accounts are not to be taken seriously as
analyses of indicative conditionals in general.
3.6 NTV
An even more radical approach says that conditionals have no truth-conditions
at all. This “NTV” (for “no truth-value”, a name given by Lycan (2001)) account
argues that conditionals do not make truth-evaluable claims but “express”
that the speaker has a high subjective probability for the consequent, given
the antecedent. The account is prominently championed by Adams (1965),
Gibbard (1981), and Edgington (1986), among others. Lycan (2001) gives quite
a few reason to think the account cannot be maintained; see also Bennett
(2003) for discussion. As far as I know, the NTV account has had no impact
at all in linguistic work on natural language semantics (but see Kaufmann
(2005a) and Cohen (2009)).
4 The restrictor analysis
The dominant approach to the semantics of conditionals in linguistics is
not so much an alternative to the accounts we have discussed so far, and
in particular not to the Stalnaker/Lewis analysis, but a radical rethinking of
the compositional structure of conditional sentences. It began with Lewis’s
(1975) paper on adverbial quantification, which dealt with sentences like
(25) If it is sunny, we always/usually/mostly/rarely/sometimes/never play
soccer.
Lewis argued that there was no plausible semantics for the conditional con-
nective that would interact compositionally with the adverbs of quantification
to give correct truth-conditions for these sentences. Instead, he argued that
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the if -clause added no conditional meaning of its own to the construction.
The idea is that the only “conditional” operator in the structure is the adverb
and that if merely serves to introduce a restriction to that operator. In
other words, where naïvely one would have thought that (25) involved the
combination of an adverbial quantificational operator with the conditional
expressed by if, Lewis argued that there was just one operator and that if
didn’t express any kind of conditional operator of its own.
Lewis himself did not generalize this idea; nowhere else in his writings
does he give any indication that if ’s found elsewhere are to be treated on a
par with the if in adverbially quantified sentences. (It should be noted that
in the adverbial quantification paper, Lewis does suggest that the if found
in construction with probability operators is also not a conditional operator
of its own, although he doesn’t say whether it is to be seen as a restrictor in
those cases. It is a shame that Lewis’s insights in the adverbial quantification
paper were not connected by him—or anyone else in the logico-philosophical
literature—to the problems surrounding conditional probability, as dis-
cussed for example in Lewis (1976); cf. also Hájek (1993). Kratzer (1986) does
make the connection but I do not think that her discussion of probability
conditionals has been taken up by logicians and philosophers.)
Kratzer took the logical step and argued that Lewis’ idea should be applied
to all conditional constructions. She put the point very concisely in Kratzer
1986: “The history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake.
There is no two-place if . . . then connective in the logical forms for natural
languages. If -clauses are devices for restricting the domains of various
operators. Whenever there is no explicit operator, we have to posit one.”
It should be noted that this proposal is not really a proposal meant to
overturn any prior conceptions about the meaning of various conditional
constructions. Rather, it is a proposal for how the meaning of those construc-
tions comes about compositionally. The central idea is that if itself does not
carry any distinctive conditional meaning, rather it is, so to speak, a helper
expression that modifies various quantificational/modal operators (cf. article
58 (Hacquard) Modality). As indicated in the quote from Kratzer, this doesn’t
just apply to when an overt operator combines with an if -clause but also
when an if -clause occurs on its own with no overt operator in sight. In that
case, Kratzer suggest, there must a covert, or at least not obviously visible,
operator. What one might call bare indicative conditionals either contain a
covert epistemic necessity modal or a covert generic frequency operator (⇡
usually/always):
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(26) a. If he left at noon, he’s home by now. [epistemic necessity]
b. If he leaves work on time, he has dinner with his family. [generic
frequency]
In bare counterfactual conditionals, one should consider the possibility that
the modal form would is the operator restricted by the if -clause, an idea
bolstered by the fact that there are if -less would-sentences such as (6),
repeated here:
(6) I would have beaten Kasparov.
Following Partee (1991), the restrictor theory of if -clauses is sometimes called
the “Lewis/Kratzer/Heim” analysis (henceforth restrictor), because after the
initial idea of Lewis and the generalization by Kratzer, the application of the
story to the analysis of donkey anaphora by Heim (1982) played a large role
in the triumph of the theory in linguistic circles.
It should be pointed out that while we earlier stressed the desire to have
a uniform(ish) analysis of indicative and subjunctive conditionals, partially
because both are if . . . then constructions, the restrictor analysis opens up
a potentially large gap between them. The uniform presence of if would
be almost entirely beside the point: how big the diﬀerence between the
two kinds is depend on what, if any, diﬀerence there is between the modal
operators present in them.
5 Recent alternatives to the restrictor analysis
5.1 Conditionals as definites
Some work has recently explored an alternative to the restrictor analysis that
does give if a more substantial role to play. The idea explored by Schein
(2003), Schlenker (2004), and Bhatt & Pancheva (2006) is that if -clauses are
definite plural descriptions of possible worlds. These works point out a series
of syntactic and semantic ways in which if -clauses behave much alike to
definite descriptions (in particular, free relatives). An interesting subplot in
that exploration is whether the semantics (for both if -clauses and for definite
descriptions) should be non-monotonic, as argued by Lewis, or monotonic
(supplemented with discourse dynamics). Schlenker (2004) leaves this as an
open question.
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5.2 Three-valued conditionals
Lewis (1975: fn.4) mentioned an alternative to the restrictor analysis of if :
“What is the price of forcing the restriction-marking if to be
a sentential connective after all? Exorbitant: it can be done if
(1) we use a third truth value, (2) we adopt a far-fetched inter-
pretation of the connective if, and (3) we impose an additional
permanent restriction on the admissible cases.”
The idea would be to give if p, q a three-valued semantics where it is
true if p and q are true, false if p is true but q is not, and has the third
truth-value if p is false. Then, operators can be defined so as to quantify
only over cases where the truth-value of the embedded conditional is not the
third truth-value, which is equivalent to them quantifying over p-cases only.
This idea goes back to Belnap (1970, 1973) and despite Lewis’ denunciation
of it as carrying an exorbitant price tag, it has been revived recently by
Geurts (2004b), von Fintel (2007), and Huitink (2008, 2009a,b,c). (Note that
McDermott (1996) had argued that such a three-valued semantics was in fact
adequate for at least certain simple conditionals.)
One argument in favor of paying the price and adopting this analysis
comes from the behavior of conditionals in discourse. As pointed out by von
Fintel (2007), examples like the following present a severe challenge to the
restrictor analysis (the problem was first identified in von Fintel 2003):
(27) A: If he didn’t tell Harry, he told Tom.
B: Probably so.
B’: That’s very unlikely.
In such dialogues, a propositional anaphor (so, that) appears to refer back to
the conditional in A’s utterance. In the restrictor analysis, the only conditional
proposition made available by A’s utterance is an epistemically modalized
conditional. But the utterance by B and B’ are not interpreted as involving
that epistemic conditional embedded under probably or unlikely. Rather,
probably so is interpreted as a simple probability conditional. So, it appears
that the best account would be one where A’s and B’s utterances share a
“bland” conditional meaning that then a local operator could be applied
to (covert epistemic modal in A’s utterance and probability operator in B’s
utterance). Adopting the Belnap meaning for conditionals, we can analyze
the dialogue in (27) as follows:
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(28) A: If he didn’t tell Harry, he told Tom.
must (if he didn’t tell Harry, he told Tom)
in all worlds compatible with the evidence where the embedded
conditional has a truth-value (i.e. where he didn’t tell Harry), he
told Tom
B: Probably so.
probably (if he didn’t tell Harry, he told Tom)
in most worlds compatible with the evidence where the embedded
conditional has a truth-value (i.e. where he didn’t tell Harry), he
told Tom
There are obvious questions and worries about the Belnap-style approach.
One is whether the Belnap conditional can stand on its own (as argued by
McDermott (1996)) or whether it always requires an operator to embed it (if
so, the account would mimic the restrictor analysis very closely). Another
topic that would need to be sorted out is that using three-valued semantics
for the mechanics of this account precludes using three-valued semantics for
modelling presupposition (as is often done) at the same time, since clearly
the antecedents of conditionals are not presupposed to be true.
5.3 Another non-restrictor analysis of if
Gillies (2009a,b) has been developing an account that also tries to restore a
conditional meaning for if -clauses and achieve the restricting eﬀect in a more
indirect way than done in the restrictor approach. In his analysis, if expresses
a contextually restricted strict implication operator, which means that there
is no need for the covert operators needed in the restrictor account. To
model the interactions with other overt operators correctly, the semantics for
if has a second component which has it restrict the domain for any operators
that might be in its scope. An interesting diﬀerence between the revived
three-valued analysis and Gillies’ analyis is that in the former operators that
end up being restricted by an if -clause take the conditional in their scope,
while in the latter they appear in the consequent of the conditional in the
scope of the if -clause. One expects that this will be of crucial importance in
deciding between the accounts.
Note that Gillies’ account will face the same problems with the behavior
of conditionals across speakers as the restrictor analysis and thus appears at
a disadvantage to the Belnap-style approach.
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6 Interactions
A crucial topic in conditional semantics is how conditionals interact with
other expressions. This has already been a thread in the preceding sections.
Here, we will look a bit more at the interaction of conditionals with modality
and with tense/aspect. Space precludes a discussion of complex conditionals
like even if, only if, and unless conditionals; for some work on complex
conditionals see Bennett 1982, von Fintel 1994 (Chapters 4 and 5), and Lycan
2001.
6.1 Conditionals and modals
The restrictor analysis predicts that if -clauses should be able to restrict any
kind of modal operator, epistemic operators and deontic operators:
(29) if -clause restricting epistemic modals:
a. If Grijpstra played his drums, (then) de Gier must have played his
flute.
b. If Grijpstra played his drums, (then) de Gier might have played
his flute.
c. If Grijpstra played his drums, (then) de Gier played his flute. [ =
covert epistemic necessity]
(30) if -clause restricting deontic modals:
a. If you broke the vase, you ought to apologize.
b. If you’re over 21, you are allowed to buy beer in this store.
6.1.1 Kratzer’s version of the Samaritan Paradox
Kratzer (1991) argues that the restrictor approach to deontic conditionals is
the crucial ingredient in the solution of a conditional version of the Samaritan
Paradox. The first step in that story, though, is to consider the original non-
conditional version of the paradox as introduced by Prior (1958). Imagine
that someone has been robbed and John is walking by. It is easy to conceive
of a code of ethics that would make the following sentence true:
(31) John must help the person who was robbed.
If modal semantics only involved quantification over a set of accessible
worlds, one would have said that (31) says that in all of the deontically
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accessible worlds (those compatible with the code of ethics) John helps the
person who was robbed. Prior’s point was that under such a semantics,
something rather unfortunate holds. Notice that in all of the worlds where
John helps the person who was robbed, someone was robbed in the first
place. Therefore, it will be true that in all of the deontically accessible worlds,
someone was robbed. Thus, (31) will entail:
(32) It must be that someone was robbed.
It clearly would be good not make such a prediction, since we might very well
want (31) to be true and (32) to be false.
A doubly-relative analysis of modality, as proposed by Kratzer (1991) and
surveyed in article 58 (Hacquard) Modality, can successfully avoid this unfor-
tunate prediction. Such an analysis assumes that an ordering is imposed on
the set of accessible worlds, with diﬀerent “ordering sources” being associ-
ated with diﬀerent flavors of modality (this can be seen as a generalization of
the similarity-based ordering in the Stalnaker/Lewis analysis of conditionals).
We can then conceive of (31) as being uttered with respect to a circumstantial
modal base that includes the fact that someone was robbed. Among those
already somewhat ethically deficient worlds, the relatively best ones are all
worlds where John helps the victim.
Note we still have the problematic fact that among the worlds in the
modal base, all are worlds where someone was robbed, and we would thus
appear to still make the unfortunate prediction that (32) should be true. But
this can now be fixed. For example, we could say that must p is semantically
defective if p is true throughout the worlds in the modal base. This could be
a presupposition or some other ingredient of meaning. So, with respect to
a modal base which pre-determines that someone was robbed, one couldn’t
felicitously say (32).
Consequently, saying (32) would only be felicitous if a diﬀerent modal
base is intended, one that contains both p and non-p worlds. And given a
choice between worlds where someone was robbed and worlds where nobody
was robbed, most deontic ordering sources would presumably choose the
no-robbery worlds, which would make (32) false, as desired.
The paradox as presented by Kratzer (1991) has a conditional form:
(33) If a murder occurs, the jurors must convene.
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Kratzer points out that if one tried to analyze (33) as a material implication
embedded under deontic necessity, then one quickly runs into a problem.
Surely, one wants the following to be a true statement about the law:
(34) There must be no murder.
But this means that in the deontically accessible worlds, all of them have no
murders occuring. Now, this means that in all of the deontically accessible
worlds, any material implication of the form “if a murder occurs, q” will be
true no matter what the consequent is since the antecedent will be false. Since
that is an absurd prediction, (33) cannot be analyzed as material implication
under deontic necessity. The combination of the restrictor approach to if -
clauses and the doubly-relative theory of modals can rescue us from this
problem. (34) is analyzed as the deontic necessity modal being restricted by
the if -clause. The set of accessible worlds is narrowed down by the if -clause
to only include worlds in which a murder occurs. The deontic ordering then
identifies the best among those worlds and those are plausibly all worlds
where the jurors convene.
6.1.2 An expected ambiguity
As pointed out at various times (as far as I know, independently in un-
published work by Craige Roberts and by Geurts (2004a)), the existence of
covert operators in Kratzer’s analysis may predict that sentence with an
overt operator and an if -clause are in fact ambiguous: one reading where the
if -clause restricts the overt operator and another reading where the if -clause
restricts a covert operator that somehow combines with the overt operator.
An example from Sarah Moss (term paper for a 2005 MIT class) shows the
reality of that prediction:
(35) If Caspar vacuums on Saturday, then Chris has to cook dinner on
Sunday.
There is a straightforward “one operator” reading of (35) where it expresses a
rule of the group sharing the apartment: every acceptable scenario in which
Caspar vacuums on Saturday is one where Chris cooks dinner on Sunday;
this reading is obtained by having the if -clause restrict the deontic modal
have to. But there is also a “two operator” reading where one says that if it
were a given observation that Caspar vacuums on Saturday then one would
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be able to conclude from that that Chris has the obligation to cook dinner
on Sunday. This two operator reading can be obtained if one assumes that
the if -clause restricts a covert epistemic necessity modal, which then in turn
embeds the deontic necessity modal have to. In this reading, (35) would be
essentially equivalent to a sentence with two nested overt modals:
(36) If Caspar vacuums on Saturday, then Chris must have to cook dinner
on Sunday.
(There are discussions of “iﬀy oughts”—that is, sentences combining if -
clauses with deontic modals— , which might profit from considering the
possibility of such an ambiguity. See for example, in the linguistic literatur:
Frank (1996) and Zvolenszky (2002). In philosophy as well, deontic condi-
tionals are of increasing interest, see for example Kolodny & MacFarlane
(2009).)
6.1.3 More on epistemic conditionals
At various points, we have assumed that a resonable analysis of conditionals
like (37) treats them as implicitly modalized with an epistemic necessity
operator:
(37) If Grijpstra played his drums, (then) de Gier played his flute.
Kratzer (1986, 2009) argues that this assumption can help solve a famous
puzzle due to Gibbard (1981: 231). Consider this scenario:
Sly Pete and Mr. Stone are playing poker on a Mississippi
riverboat. It is now up to Pete to call or fold. My henchman
Zack sees Stone’s hand, which is quite good, and signals its
content to Pete. My henchman Jack sees both hands, and sees
that Pete’s hand is rather low, so that Stone’s is the winning
hand. At this point, the room is cleared. A few minutes later,
Zack slips me a note which says “If Pete called, he won”, and
Jack slips me a note which says “If Pete called, he lost”.
The problem Gibbard saw with this example is that (i) both observers are
entirely justified in saying what they’re saying, neither is mistaken about
anything, but (ii) the two sentences they utter are intuitively contradictory:
it can’t be that it is true that if Pete called, he won at the same time as it is
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true that if Pete called, he lost. An obvious move to capture (i) is to say that
the conditionals are epistemic conditionals and that each of them is about
the respective speaker’s epistemic state. But then it is hard to understand
intuition (ii). Gibbard despaired of giving any account where conditionals
express propositions and so took his puzzle as an argument for an NTV
approach.
In recent work, much progress has been made on understanding the
context-dependency of epistemic modals in the debate between relativist
and contextualist accounts; see for example Egan et al. (2005), MacFarlane
(2006), Stephenson (2007b), and von Fintel & Gillies (2007, 2008). One would
then expect that integrating these insights into the analysis of epistemic
conditionals might help understand the Sly Pete puzzle. This indeed what
Stephenson (2007a) and Weatherson (2009) do within a relativist analysis
of epistemic modality and what Kratzer (2009) does within a contextualist
analysis based on von Fintel & Gillies (2007). This is not the place to adjudicate
between these two approaches, but one can expect fireworks to continue in
this domain.
6.2 Conditionals and tense & aspect
We will not be able to discuss the syntax of conditionals in this article (cf.
Bhatt & Pancheva 2006) but we should take a look at the morphological fine
structure of conditionals. It is quite apparent that in English at least, the
indicative/subjunctive classification of conditionals is marked by tense &
aspect morphology:
(38) a. If Grijpstra played his drums, de Gier played his flute.
b. If Grijpstra had played his drums, de Gier would have played his
flute.
The earliest works taking the role of tense & aspect in the semantics of
conditionals seriously came from Dudman (1983, 1984, 1988, 1989). Work
on the interaction of tense and conditionals in philosophical logic includes
Nute (1982, 1991), Slote (1978), Thomason & Gupta (1980), Thomason (1985).
A more recent seminal contribution is Iatridou (2000). Since then there has
been a proliferation of work on this topic; see Arregui (2005, 2007, 2009),
Copley (2006), Ippolito (2007), Kaufmann (2005b), Schulz (2008), von Stechow
(2007). Here, we can only introduce some basic facts and generalizations.
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The central observation is that what is commonly called subjunctive
in “subjunctive conditionals” is an additional layer (or two) of past tense
morphology, no matter whether the referred to state of aﬀairs is temporally
located in the past, present, or future:
(39) a. If Roman comes to the party tomorrow, it will be a grand success.
b. If Roman came to the party tomorrow, it would be a grand success.
c. If Roman had come to the party tomorrow, it would have been a
grand success.
(40) a. If Roman is at the post oﬃce now, he is missing the meeting.
b. If Roman were at the post oﬃce now, he would be missing the
meeting.
c. If Roman had been at the post oﬃce now, he would have been
missing the meeting.
(41) a. If Roman left before noon, he arrived in time.
b. If Roman had left before noon, he would have arrived in time.
Iatridou (2000) discusses this basic pattern (although she doesn’t discuss
the two layer pasts in future or present conditionals) and proposes that
the additional past does not serve a temporal function. Instead, she argues
that the past tense has a schematic semantics that can be applied both
temporally and modally: past is an “exclusion feature”, it marks that the
topic set excludes the speaker set (the analysis is related to earlier ideas that
the modal use of past relies on it being a marker of “remoteness”, see for
example Steele 1975, James 1982, and Fleischman 1989). When past is used
temporally it marks the times talked about as distinct from the now of the
speaker (an additional wrinkle is needed to explain why past means past
rather than non-present = past or future). When past is used modally it marks
the worlds talked about as distinct from the actual world of the speaker (this
does not mean that modally used past is a counterfactuality marker; rather,
the intent is to derive something very much like the Stalnaker-analysis of the
import of subjunctive marking, see the discussion in Section 3.3 above).
The alternative to Iatridou’s account is to try to maintain that the addi-
tional pasts in subjunctive conditionals do after all retain their usual temporal
meaning. This idea goes back to Dudman (1983, 1984, 1988, 1989) and has
been pursued by Ippolito (2003, 2007) and Arregui (2005, 2009), among
others. We do not have the space to survey the details of these accounts.
Let’s rather look at a simplified sketch. Suppose that the extra layer of past
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tense marks what the conditional quantifies over is a set of worlds that were
accessible from the evaluation world at a past tense but may not be anymore.
This is typically embedded in a branching futures version of possible worlds
semantics. As the time index progresses, more and more open futures are
precluded. Imagine that at some point in time, it was an open possibility
that Roman would leave before noon, but by the present time it is settled
that he did not. Then, assuming that the conditional employs a “historical
necessity”-type of accessibility relation, the time index needs to be moved
to the past to make sure that the domain of accessible worlds includes at
least some worlds where he did leave before noon. Hence, the need for past
tense marking on the modal (would = will + PAST) in If Roman had left before
noon, he would have arrived on time; the past tense in the antecedent may be
a mere agreement phenomenon.
What then about the indicative conditional in (41a)? Clearly, if we assume
a historical necessity modal, at the time of utterance it is already settled
whether Roman did or did not leave before noon. So, if there need to be at
least some antecedent worlds in the domain of the modal, the covert modal
in (41a) cannot be a historical necessity modal. Thus, it is not mysterious
why (41a) is naturally analyzed as involving a (covert) epistemic necessity
modal.
In this story, then, the diﬀerence between indicative and subjunctive
is two-fold: (i) type of accessibility relation/type of modal (epistemic vs.
historical), (ii) time index on the modal (present vs. past). An obvious
question is whether these diﬀerences cross-cut: are there past epistemic
conditionals? are there present historic necessity conditionals? The answer
to the second question is possibly yes: If Roman comes to the party tomorrow,
it will be a grand success might arguably be a non-epistemic conditional. The
answer to the first question might be expected to be no, since it is well-known
that epistemic modals resist embedding under past tense (cf. article 58
(Hacquard) Modality).
One possibly problematic fact for the view just sketched comes from
hindsight counterfactuals (Barker 1998, Edgington 2003):
(42) [A randomly tossed coin comes up heads.]
a. If you had bet on heads, you would have won.
b. If you bet on heads, you will win.
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While (42a) seems acceptable and true after the coin has come up heads,
there is no time in the past at which (42b) would have been rational to assert.
While that doesn’t mean that there wasn’t a time at which the indicative
conditional was true, it does throw some doubt on the simple idea that the
only diﬀerence between (42a) and (42b) is the temporal perspective.
7 Further reading
Many references were given throughout this article. Here are some high-
lighted readings. Indispensable classics are Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis 1973.
Good overviews: Edgington 2007 and Bennett 2003. On disjunctive an-
tecedents and related problems: van Rooij (2006) and Alonso-Ovalle (2009).
On the syntax of conditionals: Iatridou 1991 and Bhatt & Pancheva 2006. On
the contribution of then: Iatridou (1993). On the phenomenon of conditional
strengthening: van der Auwera (1997a,b), Horn (2000), and von Fintel (2001a).
On the psychology of conditionals: Oaksford & Chater (2003), Over & Evans
(2003), and Evans & Over (2004).
I would like to thank my teacher Angelika Kratzer and my colleagues Irene
Heim and Bob Stalnaker: without them I wouldn’t understand a thing about
conditionals. Thanks also to my frequent collaborators Sabine Iatridou and
Thony Gillies: without them I wouldn’t have anything to say about condition-
als. Finally, thanks to Andy Fugard, Thony Gillies, and Janneke Huitink for
comments a draft of this article.
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